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COMMENT

Polluting Without Consequence: How BP and
Other Large Government Contractors Evade
Suspension and Debarment for
Environmental Crime and Misconduct
JUSTIN M. DAVIDSON*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Like any business, the federal government has a strong
interest in conducting business with trustworthy, responsible,
and ethical corporate partners.
The government relies on
approved and qualified contractors to provide critical goods and
services that allow the government to function smoothly and
properly. Because some companies with whom the government
contracts with might commit environmental crime or engage in
environmental misconduct, the government is uniquely situated
to regulate such business activities to protect themselves and the
public from contracting with irresponsible and unethical entities
who have engaged in such wrongdoing.
The government can protect itself from conducting business
with criminal or irresponsible contractors through the process of
suspension and debarment. Under this doctrine, government
contractors who commit a criminal or civil offense, engage in
corporate misconduct, or otherwise act irresponsibly in connection
with a held government contract are prevented from obtaining

* J.D. Candidate, Certificate of Environmental Law, Pace University School of
Law, 2012. B.A., Washington University in St. Louis, 2007. I would like to
thank Mr. Mike Walker, U.S. EPA, for his guidance and support throughout this
undertaking, as well as members of the PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW
editorial staff for their comments and suggestions during the editing process.
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future government contracts and nonprocurement transactions.1
With this authority, suspension and debarment are necessary
and powerful tools available to all federal agencies to ensure that
the government continues doing business only with honest and
responsible contractors.
To that end, suspension and debarment has, for the most
part, been effective in protecting the government from
irresponsible and unethical small partners or individuals.
However, as this Comment argues, current practice as regulated
under the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) is largely
ineffective and underutilized to adequately protect the
government and public interest from large corporate partners
engaging in environmentally irresponsible or unethical conduct.
This Comment suggests that certain reforms to the FAR and a
greater willingness to initiate suspension and debarment
proceedings by federal agencies against large corporate entities
who commit environmental crimes or misconduct will improve
environmental compliance and properly hold contractors
responsible for their environmental wrongdoings.
Part II of this Comment lays out the relevant historical and
regulatory framework underlying the suspension and debarment
regime, focusing on the procedural and substantive rules that are
specified in the FAR. Part III of this Comment discusses
suspension and debarment in the context of environmental
crimes and misconduct, particularly emphasizing how corporate
environmental behavior is treated under the FAR and how the
EPA’s suspension and debarment program has evolved over the
years. Part IV of this Comment investigates British Petroleum,
Inc. (BP) as a case study, analyzing its history of environmental
noncompliance, utilizing Deepwater Horizon as a backdrop. The

1. Nonprocurement transactions are “any transaction [other than]
procurement contract transactions,” including but not limited to grants,
cooperative agreements, scholarships, loans, subsidies, insurances, and
contracts of assistance.
See 2 C.F.R. § 180.970(a) (2010).
Although
nonprocurement transactions are covered under the Nonprocurement Common
Rule (NCR), Government-wide Debarment and Suspension (Nonprocurement)
and Government-wide Requirements for Drug-Free Workplace (Grants), 68 Fed.
Reg. 66,534 (Nov. 26, 2003) (to be codified at 5 C.F.R. pt. 970), this Comment
focuses primarily on the effects of suspension and debarment on agency
procurement actions.
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Part goes on to discuss how a large company like BP has
effectively evaded the arm of company-wide discretionary
debarment and investigates the legal framework for such evasion.
Finally, Part V of this Comment analyzes the flaws in the current
debarment regime and offers proposals for reforming the system
and ensuring compliance with the environmental statutes and
the purposes of suspension and debarment as a whole.
II.

BACKGROUND AND REGULATORY
FRAMEWORK

A. Introduction to Suspension and Debarment Under
the FAR
Suspension and debarment are actions that the federal
government takes to prevent certain businesses and individuals
from obtaining government contracts and nonprocurement
transactions when that entity has committed a criminal or civil
offense, engaged in corporate misconduct, or otherwise acted
irresponsibly in connection with a held government contract.2
The suspension and debarment process is a means for
determining a contractor’s present responsibility to do business
with the government and for protecting the public interest—it is
not intended to be used as a means of punishing participants or
contractors.
Rather, the process focuses on whether the
respondent has demonstrated a lack of business integrity or
business honesty, an inability to perform government contracts in
a satisfactory manner, or whether some other factor has a serious
and direct effect on their present responsibility. If a contractor is
determined to no longer be presently responsible and is
subsequently suspended or debarred, they are prohibited from

2. See e.g., FAR 2.01 (2011) (defining “debarment” as an “action taken by a
debarring official under [FAR] 9.406 to exclude a contractor from Government
contracting and Government-approved subcontracting for a reasonable, specified
period; a contractor that is excluded is ‘debarred.’” “Suspension” is defined as
“action taken by a suspending official under [FAR] 9.407 to disqualify a
contractor temporarily from Government contracting and Government-approved
subcontracting; a contractor that is disqualified is ‘suspended’.” See also FAR
9.4.

3
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receiving or being awarded new contracts, subcontracts, or
nonprocurement grants for a specified period of time.3
B. Purpose and Policy Considerations
The two primary goals underlying the suspension and
debarment regime are (1) to protect the government from
business relations with dishonest, unethical, criminal, or
otherwise irresponsible contractors or persons; and (2) to induce
compliance with national socioeconomic programs.4 The federal
government protects the public interest by ensuring the integrity
of federal programs by conducting business only with responsible
persons.
The government does not want to contract with
companies or persons who have demonstrated a lack of business
integrity or honesty and an inability to perform government
contracts in a satisfactory manner, or who have engaged in such
conduct as to have a serious and direct effect on their present
responsibility.
It is easy to confuse the purposes and effects of the
suspension and debarment process with agency enforcement
mechanisms. A common misconception about suspension and
debarment is that it is used to punish contractors for
irresponsible or illicit conduct; after all, the effect of being barred
from holding government contracts for a specified period of time
has serious business implications. However, suspension and
debarment is imposed only to protect the government and public
interest from conducting business with unethical or irresponsible
partners; it is strictly a business decision and is not meant to be
punitive.5 As explained by the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals,
“The security of the United States, and thus of the general public,
depends upon the quality and reliability of items supplied by
those contractors. . . . Debarment reduces the risk of harm to the

3. FAR 9.405(a).
4. See generally Brian D. Shannon, Debarment and Suspension Revisited:
Fewer Eggs in the Basket?, 44 CATH. U. L. REV. 363 (1995) (discussing
government’s effort to protect the public through the suspension and debarment
process).
5. See FAR 9.402(b).
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system by eliminating the source of the risk, that is, the unethical
or incompetent contractor.”6
C. Differences Between Suspension and Debarment
There are three chief differences between suspension and
debarment: (1) the length of exclusion; (2) the standard of proof
needed to make an official agency determination; and (3) the
timing of the imposition of the proceeding. First, debarment
imposes a much lengthier term of exclusion upon the contractor
than suspension.
Generally, a debarring official imposes
debarment for a specified period that is “commensurate with the
seriousness of the cause(s)” as a final determination that a person
or company is not presently responsible, generally not to exceed
three years.7 However, although the FAR provides guidance of
up to three years’ exclusion,8 it is not limited to three years, and
longer periods of debarment may be imposed where
circumstances warrant if the debarring official determines that
an extension is necessary to protect the government’s interest.9
For example, one court found that an agency’s decision to debar a
contractor for fifteen years was reasonable.10 So long as the
debarring agency has a “reasonable basis” on which to fix the
period of debarment, a reviewing court cannot substitute its
judgment of an appropriate period for debarment.11
In contrast to debarment, suspension is imposed as a
temporary status of ineligibility for procurement and
nonprocurement transactions, pending completion of an
investigation or legal proceeding when it is determined that
immediate action is necessary to protect the government’s
6. Caiola v. Carroll, 851 F.2d 395, 398-99 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
7. FAR 9.406-4(a)(1).
8. Id.
9. Id. at 9.406-4(b).
10. See Coccia v. Def. Logistics Agency, Civ. A. No. 89-6544, 1992 WL 345106,
at *5 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 12, 1992) (agreeing with plaintiff’s attorney that
“[A]lthough a debarment generally is imposed for three years, there is no
maximum period. The Government thus is free to impose longer periods in
egregious circumstances that present an unusual threat to the Government’s
business interests.”).
11. See Shane Meat Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 800 F.2d 334, 336-39 (3d Cir.
1986).
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interest.12 Generally, this temporary period of exclusion cannot
exceed eighteen months, but if a legal proceeding has been
initiated within that period, the suspension can last as long as
such proceeding is ongoing, including any appeal.13 For example,
in Frequency Electronics, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of the Air Force,14 the
Fourth Circuit upheld a suspension throughout the nearly fiveyear period of legal proceedings before an indictment was made.15
Second, the standard of proof required for an agency
determination differs between suspension and debarment. A
debarring official must conclude based on a preponderance of the
evidence that the contractor has engaged in conduct that
warrants debarment, whereas a suspending official, on the other
hand, can impose a suspension “on the basis of adequate evidence,
pending the completion of investigation or legal proceedings,
when it has been determined that immediate action is necessary
to protect the Government’s interest.”16
Third, debarment is imposed only after giving the respondent
notice of the action and an opportunity to contest the proposed
debarment (through a “notice of proposed debarment”).
Suspension, in contrast, is usually imposed first by the
suspending official, who promptly notifies the suspended person
and provides the person an opportunity to contest the suspension
and have it removed.17
D. Types of Debarment Actions: Discretionary and
Statutory
There are two types of debarment proceedings available to a
debarring official: (1) discretionary debarment and (2) statutory
debarment.
Under discretionary debarment, agencies may
suspend or debar a contractor based on their discretion for any of
a number of causes set out in the FAR. Such causes include, but

12. FAR 9.407-1(b)(1).
13. Id. at 9.407-4(a) to (b).
14. 151 F.3d 1029 (4th Cir. 1998).
15. Id. at 1035.
16. See FAR 9.406-3(d)(3) (debarment standard of proof) and FAR 9.4071(b)(1) (suspension standard of proof).
17. Id.
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are not limited to: (a) criminal and civil violations, such as the
commission of fraud or a criminal offense related to obtaining or
performing a government contract; (b) unsatisfactory
performance of public contracts and transactions, such as the
willful failure to perform in accordance with the terms of one of
more public contracts, a history of unsatisfactory performance, or
failure to perform one or more contracts; (c) certain labor and
trade violations or commission of an unfair trade practice; or (d)
acting in any other way that demonstrates a “lack of business
integrity or business honesty that seriously and directly affects
the present responsibility of the contractor.”18
Statutory debarment refers to the automatic or mandatory
debarment of contractors for violations of certain federal statutes
that include debarment provisions. In the environmental law
context, both the Clean Water Act (CWA)19 and Clean Air Act
(CAA)20 contain debarment provisions prohibiting federal
agencies from entering into contracts with persons convicted of a
criminal offense falling under the criminal penalty sections of the
respective statutes.21
The primary purpose of statutory
debarment under the CWA and CAA is to undertake federal
procurement activities in a manner that improves and enhances
environmental quality by promoting effective enforcement of the
Acts. The Acts both provide (nearly identically): “The prohibition
[of contracting with contractors who have violated the respective
criminal provisions] shall continue until the Administrator
certifies that the condition giving rise to such conviction has been
corrected.”22 In implementing and enforcing the CWA and CAA,
EPA’s objective is not merely to require that the facility stop the
violation or remove contamination resulting from the violation,
but also to require a demonstration that management has reacted
18. FAR 9.406-2(a).
19. Clean Water Act [CWA] §§ 101—607, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251—1387 (2006).
20. Clean Air Act [CAA] §§ 101—618, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401—7671 (2006).
21. E.g., CWA § 508(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1368(a) (“No Federal agency may enter
into any contract with any person, who has been convicted of any offense under
section 1319(c) of this title, for the procurement of goods, materials and services
. . . .”); CAA § 306(a), 42 U.S.C. § 7606(a) (“No Federal agency may enter into
any contract with any person who is convicted of any offense under section
7413(c) of this title for the procurement of goods, materials, and services. . . .”).
22. CWA § 508(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1368(a); CAA § 306(a), 42 U.S.C. § 7606(a).
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responsibly to the event and will monitor and assure that
violations are not likely to recur in the future.23
While environmentalists and proponents of a strong
suspension and debarment regime might applaud the automatic
and mandatory nature of statutory debarment on its face, this
classification is misleading.
A critical feature of statutory
debarment is that it tends to be less severe than its discretionary
debarment counterpart, despite its requirement for automatic or
mandatory action. Unlike discretionary debarment, statutory
debarment typically prohibits the government from granting
contracts or subcontracts only to the specific facility where the
accident or violation happened.24 As discussed in greater detail
in Part IV, infra, this means that large corporations owning and
operating multiple facilities will not necessarily be debarred for
civil violations or criminal convictions under the CWA and CAA,
only that the specific facility where the violation occurred will be
debarred. This could provide a legal loophole that allows large
companies with multiple facilities that systematically violate
CWA and CAA provisions to avoid the full impact of debarment
since they will, as a company on the whole, be able to continue
doing business with the government.
E. Determination of Present Responsibility under
Discretionary Suspension and Debarment
In determining whether to suspend or propose to debar a
contractor, the Suspension or Debarment Official (SDO) must
determine whether a respondent is “presently responsible” and
whether debarment is in the government’s interest.25 The
criteria used in making that determination differs depending on
whether the contractor is being considered for suspension or
proposed for debarment. A debarring official must consider a
23. See Incentives for Self-Policing: Discovery, Disclosure, Correction, and
Prevention of Violations, 65 Fed. Reg. 19,618, 19,619 (Apr. 11, 2000).
24. See, e.g., CWA § 508(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1368(a) (“. . . [prohibited from
entering into contracts] if such contract is to be performed at any facility at
which the violation which gave rise to such conviction occurred, and if such
facility is owned, leased, or supervised by such person.”) (emphasis added);
Clean Air Act § 306(a), 42 U.S.C. §7606(a) (same).
25. See FAR 9.406-1(a).
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number of mitigating factors before mandating the debarment
action, including whether the contractor: (1) had an internal
control system and effective standards of conduct in place during
the activity that is the cause of the debarment, or adopted such
procedures prior to any government investigation of the activity;
(2) brought the activity to the attention of the appropriate
government agency in a timely or voluntary manner; (3)
undertook a full
investigation involving the circumstances
surrounding the cause for debarment and, if so, allowed the
debarring official to examine the results; (4) fully cooperated with
government agencies, any court, or any administrative proceeding
during the investigation; (5) paid all criminal, civil, and
administrative liability related to their conduct; (6) took
appropriate disciplinary action against the individuals
responsible for the improper activity; (7) implemented or agreed
to implement remedial measures; (8) instituted new or revised
review and control procedures and ethics training programs; (9)
had sufficient time to eliminate the circumstances within the
organization which led to the cause for debarment; and (10) that
the contractor’s management recognized and understood the
seriousness of the misconduct giving rise to the cause for
debarment and had implemented programs to prevent
recurrence.26
A suspending official, on the other hand, does not have the
same restrictions and guidelines that a debarring official has
under the FAR. Just because a cause for suspension may exist
does not necessarily require that the contractor be suspended; in
view of the seriousness of the contractor’s acts or omissions, the
suspending official may consider certain remedial measures or
mitigating factors in deciding whether to suspend a contractor.27
Nonetheless, it is important to note that “the existence or
nonexistence of any remedial measures or mitigating factors is

26. Id. at 9.406-1(a)(1) to (10).
27. See id. at 9.407-1(b)(2) (“A contractor has the burden of promptly
presenting to the suspending official evidence of remedial measures or
mitigating factors when it has reason to know that a cause for suspension
exists.”).
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F. Effects of Suspension and Debarment
When a contractor is suspended or proposed for debarment, it
is immediately placed on the General Services Administration
(GSA) Excluded Party List System (EPLS) (also known as the
“GSA List”).29 The EPLS is essentially a “blacklist” of contractors
compiled, maintained, and distributed by the GSA containing the
names, addresses, and identity of parties debarred, suspended, or
voluntarily excluded from federal contracting.30 A contractor
placed on the EPLS is excluded from receiving government
contracts and subcontracts subject to federal approval, and
agencies are not to solicit offers from, award contracts to, or
consent to subcontracts with contractors on the GSA List unless
the procuring agency’s head or designee determines that there is
a “compelling reason” for contracting with the excluded party.31
Contracting officers cannot even evaluate the offers of contractors
or include them in the competitive range for evaluation of other
offerors.32 Additionally, contractors are also excluded from
conducting business with the Government as agents or
representatives of other contractors when such entity has been
debarred, suspended, or proposed for debarment.33
The consequences of being placed on the GSA List can be
severe and quite expansive, regardless of whether the contractor
is temporarily suspended or debarred for a longer term. After all,
“[a] contractor withering away without the ability to compete
does not value the artificial legal distinction between debarment

28. Id.
29. See id. at 2.101 (defining EPLS); see also id. at 9.404 (providing more
information on EPLS and GSA).
30. Id. at 2.101; see also id. at 9.404. “Voluntary exclusion” refers to a
contractor’s settlement with the government whereby the contractor voluntarily
chooses to exclude itself from participating in government contracting or
subcontracting for a specified period or because of a Notice of Proposal to Debar.
See 48 C.F.R. § 1509.406-3(a)(3)(vi).
31. FAR 9.405(a).
32. Id. at 9.405(d)(3).
33. Id. at 9.405(a).
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and temporary debarment when the practical effects are
The effect of a suspension or debarment is
identical.”34
government-wide,35 meaning, for instance, that if a company is
debarred by the EPA for environmental misconduct, that same
company cannot receive future contracts or subcontracts by other
federal agencies, like the Department of Defense or Department
of Labor, until that company has been removed from the GSA
List entirely. Discretionary debarment decisions ordinarily apply
to all divisions and other organizational units of a company,
unless specifically limited by the terms of the decision.36 This
means that a discretionary debarment affects the entire company,
and not just disparate business units or facilities. The agency
has considerable discretion in deciding the scope for which
suspension and debarment actions may apply. For instance,
depending on the nature and extent of improper activity,
exclusion from contracting can be imputed to: the contractor as
an entity based on the fraudulent, criminal, or seriously improper
conduct of its employees and officials (officers, directors,
shareholders, partners, or other individuals associated with the
organization); employees as individuals based on the conduct of
the contractor; individuals based upon the misconduct of another
individual; extension to affiliates; and participants in a joint
venture.37
Additionally, there may be other collateral consequences felt
by the debarred entity beyond the ability to contract with the
government alone. First and foremost, there is the potentially
devastating financial impact on contractors who depend on
contracts with the government to remain viable but who are
excluded from competing.38 The ramifications of being found
guilty of criminal environmental violations can also severely
34. Todd J. Canni, Shoot First, Ask Questions Later: An Examination and
Critique of Suspension and Debarment Practice Under the FAR, Including a
Discussion of the Mandatory Disclosure Rule, the IBM Suspension, and Other
Noteworthy Developments, 38 PUB. CONT. L.J. 547, 551 (2009).
35. FAR 9.401.
36. Id. at 9.406-1(b).
37. Id. at 9.406-5.
38. See Canni, supra note 34, at 551 (“This is especially so for small to
medium-sized businesses focusing solely on government business that may lack
the financial means to remain viable during the period of exclusion.”).
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injure the reputation of a business for years to come.39 Other
examples of non-federal effects include: ineligibility to contract
with state/local governments;40 denial or revocation of export
licenses;41 denial, suspension, or revocation of an organization’s
security clearance;42 or a material financial impact to commercial
sales because publicly held companies may need to disclose the
potential financial impact of suspension or debarment in their
public disclosures required by federal securities law (i.e.,
quarterly or annual reports).
III.

SUSPENSION AND DEBARMENT IN THE
CONTEXT OF ENVIRONMENTAL CRIME AND
MISCONDUCT

Just like any other proper cause for suspension or
debarment, a company or individual may be suspended or
debarred by a federal agency for waste, fraud, abuse, poor
performance, noncompliance, or other criminal behavior
associated with environmental misconduct.
The EPA’s
debarment program is governed by Executive Order 12,549,
EPA’s own nonprocurement debarment regulation, 40 CFR Part
32, and by the FAR, 49 CFR Part 9. EPA is unique in its role as
steward of environmental protection in that it is one of only three
federal government agencies to have a full-time debarment office
devoted to determining the present responsibility of federal
contractors and for issuing suspension and debarment
39. Carol Dinkins & Sean Lonnquist, The Belt and Suspenders Approach:
The Advantages of a Formalized Environmental Compliance Program, 2009
UTAH L. REV. 1129, 1129 (2009).
40. Some states follow the ABA Model Procurement Code for State and Local
Governments (2000), while others have directly written suspension and
debarment provisions directly into their state statutes or regulations. See, e.g.,
Procurement Lobbying
Guidelines, N.Y. DEP’T OF STATE (2006),
http://www.dos.ny.gov/procurement/lobby.htm; see also Debarment Information,
N.Y. DEP’T OF LABOR, http://www.labor.ny.gov/workerprotection/publicwork/
PWDebarmentInformation.shtm (last visited Nov. 30, 2011).
41. See 22 C.F.R. § 126.7(a)(5).
42. See, e.g., DEP’T OF DEFENSE, INDUSTRIAL SECURITY REGULATION 5220.22-R,
§ C2.1.12.7, available at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/522022r.
pdf (explaining that because “[d]ebarment and suspension actions . . . are
considered pertinent from a security interest point of view,” facilities listed on
the GSA list “would normally be ineligible for a security clearance.”).
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decisions.43 Other federal agencies with authority to suspend or
debar, in contrast, have only part-time debarring officials who
typically work for the agency’s respective procurement office.
Debarring officers who work for the very procurement offices
responsible for arranging and securing federal contracts might
face a potential conflict of interest when determining a proper
cause of action concerning a contractor’s actions. An agency that
possesses its own Suspension and Debarment Office separate
from its procurement office, like the EPA,44 is theoretically able
to remove itself from any such potential conflicts and focus its
efforts strictly on the business decision of whether to suspend or
debar a contractor.
The EPA’s debarment program began in 1982 as an attempt
by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to respond to
and correct Government-wide inadequacies in the management of
federal contracts and assistance with regard to waste, fraud,
abuse, and poor performance.45
This “comprehensive
Government-wide debarment and suspension system” developed
by OMB applied to all federal contracts, assistance, loans and
benefits extended by Executive-Branch agencies, including
EPA.46
In addition to EPA’s discretionary authority to debar,47 it
also has mandatory debarment authority under section 306 of the
Clean Air Act48 and section 508 of the Clean Water Act.49
Substantially, the texts of the provisions are identical:
No Federal agency may enter into any contract with any person
who is convicted of any offense under [CAA § 113(c) or CWA §
309(c)] . . . for the procurement of goods, materials, and services
43. The other two federal agencies containing full-time debarment offices are
the U.S. Air Force and U.S. Navy.
44. See Suspension & Debarment Program, EPA OFFICE OF GRANTS &
DEBARMENT, http://www.epa.gov/ogd/sdd/debarment.htm (last updated Apr. 8,
2011).
45. See A Brief History of EPA’s Debarment Program, EPA OFFICE OF GRANTS
& DEBARMENT, http://www.epa.gov/ogd/sdd/history.htm (last updated Jan. 14,
2010).
46. Id.
47. See supra Part II.D.
48. CAA § 306, 42 U.S.C. § 7606.
49. CWA § 508, 42 U.S.C. § 1368.
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to perform such contract at any facility at which the violation
which gave rise to such conviction occurred if such facility is
owned, leased, or supervised by such person. The prohibition in
the preceding sentence shall continue until the Administrator
certifies that the condition giving rise to such a conviction has
been corrected.50

In line with these congressional mandates, it is the national
policy of the federal government to
. . . improve and enhance environmental quality. In furtherance
of that policy, the [debarment] program [mandates] . . . [are]
instituted to assure that each Federal agency empowered to enter
into contracts for the procurement of goods, materials, or services
and each Federal agency empowered to extend Federal assistance
by way of grant, loan, or contract shall undertake such
procurement and assistance activities in a manner that will
result in effective enforcement of the Clean Air Act . . . and the . .
. [Clean Water Act].51

Originally, the EPA divided its suspension and debarment
program into three offices: the Office of Enforcement (statutory
debarment); the Procurement and Contracts Management
Division
(procurement
debarment);
and
the
Grants
Administration Division (assistance debarment).52 In 1982, the
discretionary procurement and assistance debarment authority
was consolidated into the Grants Administration Division by the
Office of Administration and Resource Management (OARM).53
Then, in the early 1990s, the Agency further consolidated its
debarment program into the Office of Grants and Debarment
(OGD), located within the Office of Enforcement, where “all EPA
discretionary and statutory debarment authority is delegated to
the Assistant Administrator for OARM and [is] carried out by the

50. CAA § 306(a), 42 U.S.C. §7606(a); see also CWA § 508(a), 33 U.S.C. §
1368(a).
51. Exec. Order No. 11,738, 38 Fed. Reg. 25,161, 25,161 (Sept. 10, 1973).
52. A Brief History of EPA’s Debarment Program, EPA OFFICE OF GRANTS &
DEBARMENT, http://www.epa.gov/ogd/sdd/history.htm (last updated Jan. 14,
2011).
53. Id.
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Office of Grants and Debarment (OGD).”54 According to the EPA
website:
The Suspension and Debarment Division (SDD) [a division
within the OGD] interacts with EPA program offices, the Office
of the Inspector General, Department of Justice, and with
federal, state and local agencies, to develop matters for
consideration by the EPA Debarring Official. . . . The EPA
Debarring Official is the Agency’s national program manager. As
such, the EPA Debarring Official establishes the Agency’s
debarment policy, and is the decision official for all suspension
and debarment actions before the Agency.55

The separation of suspension and debarment decisions from
procurement decisions and the merger of debarment roles into
one office represent EPA’s efforts to combine its vast contracting
resources with its considerable enforcement clout.56
Besides the legislative and regulatory directives, EPA follows
a number of guidance documents and internal memoranda to help
base their suspension and debarment decisions connected with
environmental conduct. Of particular note, EPA has a Voluntary
Disclosure Program, the purpose of which is to “enhance
protection of human health and the environment by encouraging
regulated entities to voluntarily discover, promptly disclose and
expeditiously correct violations of Federal environmental
requirements.”57 By providing incentives for regulated entities to
detect, promptly disclose, and expeditiously correct violations of
federal environmental law, the Policy sets forth nine conditions,
which if met by regulated entities, may allow them to become
eligible for 100 percent mitigation of any gravity-based penalties
that could otherwise be assessed.58 Such conditions include: (1)
systematic discovery of the violation through an Environmental
Audit or a Compliance Management System; (2) voluntary
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Memorandum from Jonathan S. Cole, Senior Attorney, EPA (on file with
author).
57. Incentives for Self-Policing: Discovery, Disclosure, Correction and
Prevention of Violations, 65 Fed. Reg. 19,618, 19,618 (Apr. 11, 2000) (known as
the “EPA Voluntary Disclosure Program”).
58. Id.
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discovery; (3) prompt disclosure; (4) discovery and disclosure
independent of government or third party plaintiff; (5) correction
and remediation; (6) prevent recurrence; (7) no repeat violations;
(8) violations not resulting in serious actual harm to the
environment or present an imminent and substantial
endangerment to public health or the environment; and (9)
cooperation with Agency investigation.59
With all these legislative, executive, and administrative
mandates, EPA has a generally strong debarment program for
ensuring that the Agency is only conducting business with
presently responsible partners. As evinced by their Voluntary
Disclosure Program, EPA is primarily concerned about “whether
any mitigating factors or remedial measures show that the
business risk of dealing with the individual has been eliminated
to the extent that debarment is unnecessary.”60
As an example of the reach of EPA’s concerns, in Burke v.
EPA, the D.C. District Court upheld a five-year debarment of a
landfill operator by the EPA, concluding that EPA’s five-year
debarment was not arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of
discretion.61 In that case, Paul Burke, the owner and sole
shareholder of an Alabama landfill, negligently discharged
excessive amounts of leachate, a liquid by-product produced in
landfills, into a creek in violation of the CWA.62 The negligent
discharge of leachate resulted in the contamination of a direct
drinking water source for residents of Birmingham, Alabama.63
Concluding that Burke’s criminal conviction provided cause for
debarment and that Burke did not demonstrate sufficient
mitigating factors or remedial measures showing that debarment
was unnecessary, EPA found that a five-year, as opposed to a
three-year, period of debarment was warranted under the
circumstances.64 Particularly, because the factual misconduct
providing the basis for Burke’s criminal conviction “show[ed] a
serious lack of business responsibility,” EPA did not act
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Id. at 19,621-23.
Burke v. EPA, 127 F. Supp. 2d 235, 240 (D.D.C. 2001).
Id. at 242-43.
Id. at 236-37.
Id. at 237.
Id. at 242.
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arbitrarily or capriciously in finding that a nexus existed between
Burke’s criminal conviction and his business integrity.65 In
making its determination, the EPA Debarring Official considered
and evaluated relevant mitigating factors such as Burke’s
culpability, the seriousness of the misconduct, the time that had
elapsed, appropriate remedial measures taken, court-imposed
sanctions, character before and after the offense, and compliance
with the consent order.66 Ultimately, however, EPA found that
“[o]nly when Mr. Burke was forced into a position of compliance
by [Alabama Department of Environmental Management] did he
begin to implement actions that should have been a part of the
daily operation of [the landfill] . . . [and] Mr. Burke has not
presented persuasive evidence of altered personal business
conduct which demonstrates that he now does not pose a risk to
the government.”67
Therefore, a five-year debarment was
appropriate rather than the common three-year period. Even
though debarment is generally imposed for a three-year period, a
longer time frame is permitted when “extension is necessary to
protect the Government’s interest.”68
The wide discretion given to EPA and high level of
consideration it places on a contractor’s mitigation and
remediation practices were similarly demonstrated when EPA
suspended IBM Corporation. On March 27, 2008, following an
investigation, EPA found that IBM employees obtained protected
source selection information from an EPA employee and used the
information during its negotiations to improve its chance of
winning a government contract.
IBM officials knew this
information was improperly acquired in violation of federal
procurement procedures and the Federal Procurement Policy
Integrity Act.69 Here, the EPA Debarring Official determined
that “immediate action was necessary to preclude an award of a
federal contract to an offeror whose employees may have

65. Burke, 127 F. Supp. 2d at 240.
66. Id. at 241.
67. Id.
68. See FAR 9.406-4(b).
69. IBM Corp., EPA Interim Agreement, EPA Case No. 08-0113-00 (Apr. 13,
2008), http://www.contractormisconduct.org/ass/contractors/32/cases/903/1179/
ibm-suspension_agreement.pdf.
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participated in illegal activities in receiving and using
information about its competitors’ bid and other information to
increase its chance of winning the contract award.”70 However,
the suspension was lifted one week later on April 3, 2008, because
of IBM’s prompt response to the suspension. Upon receiving the
Notice of Suspension, IBM management officials and counsel
initiated an immediate ‘high priority’ internal investigation into
the allegations and promptly took steps to remediate and
mitigate the situation. The remedial and mitigating actions
taken by IBM included (1) publicly acknowledging the
seriousness of the offense; (2) withdrawing its offer from further
consideration in the subject procurement; (3) refunding attorney
fees and costs to EPA; (4) pledging IBM’s full commitment to
conduct an examination of the company’s federal compliance
program and taking whatever corrective actions necessary; (4)
placing responsible individuals on administrative leave; and (5)
agreeing to cooperate fully with EPA and the U.S. Attorney’s
Office in bringing the matter to a prompt and appropriate
conclusion.71 Based on IBM’s forthright representations and
offers of remediation and mitigation made, EPA agreed to
immediately terminate the suspension imposed on March 27,
2008 and remove IBM’s name from the Excluded Parties List.72
IV.

CASE STUDY: BP AS GOVERNMENT
CONTRACTOR

British Petroleum, Inc. (BP) is one of the world’s largest oil
and gas companies. In addition to supplying fuel, heat, and
energy to individual consumers around the globe, BP is also an
enormous contractor with the United States government, whose
contracts generate revenues in the billions of dollars annually. In
fact, BP is the Pentagon’s largest single supplier of fuel, providing
nearly twelve percent of the total fuel purchased in fiscal year
(FY) 2009, and having contracts worth at least $980 million in FY

70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
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2010.73 In the Middle East, BP supplies eighty percent of the fuel
used by the military in the war effort.74 Additionally, BP
operates 22,000 oil and gas wells across the United States, many
located on federal lands or waters75. These wells produce thirtynine percent of the company’s total global revenue, about $16
billion.76 As a government contractor, BP’s actions as a business
partner of the federal government fall under the scrutiny of
debarment provisions in the FAR.
Despite this large presence in federal contracting, BP has a
long history of incurring both criminal and civil fines and
penalties—particularly due to environmental accidents, leaks,
and threats to human health and safety. Prior to the April 20,
2010 Deepwater Horizon disaster that made national headline
news for months, BP had five other major incidents in the past
ten years, all tallying up major fines and other costs for BP.77 In
October 2000, BP received a felony conviction for illegally
dumping hazardous waste down a well hole to cut costs; in a
settlement, they agreed to a five-year probationary period.78 In
March 2005, an explosion at a BP Texas City oil refinery—the
third largest refinery in the United States—claimed the lives of
fifteen employees and injured 170 others; BP pleaded guilty to a
felony and paid a $50 million fine in connection with their
violations under the CAA.79 In March 2006, an oil spill along
73. R. Jeffrey Smith, BP Has Steady Sales at Defense Department Despite
U.S. Scrutiny, WASH. POST (July 5, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2010/ 07/04/AR2010070403632.html.
74. Jason Leopold, Ex-EPA Officials: Why Isn’t BP Under Criminal
Investigation?, TRUTH-OUT (May 28, 2010), http://www.truth-out.org/ex-epaofficials-why-isnt-bp-under-criminal-investigation59936.
75. Abraham Lustgarten, EPA Officials Weigh Sanctions Against BP’s U.S.
Operations, PROPUBLICA (May 21, 2010, 12:27 P.M.), http://www.propublica.org/
article/epa-officials-weighing-sanctions-against-bps-us-operations.
76. Id.
77. Leopold, supra note 74.
78. Lustgarden, supra note 75.
79. Leopold, supra note 74; see also Daniel Schorn, The Explosion at Texas
City, CBS NEWS (Feb. 11, 2009, 5:49 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/
2006/10/26/ 60minutes/main2126509.shtml; see also Ramit Plushnick-Masti, BP
Texas City Refinery Explosion: Company To Pay State $50 Million Over Air
Pollution Violations, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 3, 2011, 3:30 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/11/03/bp-texas-city-refinery-explosion_n_
1074086.html.
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Alaska’s north coast resulted in more than 200,000 gallons of
crude oil being spilled into Prudhoe Bay—the largest spill on
Alaska’s north coast ever.80 The spill was caused by severely
corroded pipelines for which BP failed to perform routine
maintenance and upkeep. Again, BP pleaded guilty to negligent
discharge of oil, a criminal misdemeanor under the CWA,81 and
paid $20 million in fines.82 In 2004, BP entered into a Deferred
Prosecution Agreement with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) related to a price-fixing gas market scheme
involving propane trading.83 Counting as a conviction under
debarment law, BP paid a $303 million fine.84
In the three instances where BP has had a felony or
misdemeanor criminal conviction levied against it under the CAA
or CWA, the responsible BP facility where the accident or
violation occurred faced statutory debarment and the specific
facility was automatically deemed ineligible to receive any future
federally-funded contracts, but the company, as a whole,
proceeded unhindered under a “business as usual” regime.85
After each incident, BP vowed to make the remedial changes and
solutions necessary to demonstrate their present responsibility.86
However, it does not appear that BP has done so. For instance,
despite BP’s admission that their written procedures were
inadequate to ensure its equipment’s safety and that it had failed
to inform employees of known fire and explosion risks at the
Texas City refinery, BP did not fix the problems at the rebuilt
Texas City refinery.87 In fact, in October 2009, the Occupational
80. Leopold, supra note 74; see also Jason Leopold, Prudhoe Bay, BP’s Other
(June
16,
2010),
Ticking
Bomb,
CONSORTIUMNEWS.COM
http://www.consortiumnews.com/Print/2010/061610a.html.
81. See CWA § 309(c)(1)(A), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(1)(A); see also CWA § 309(f),
33 U.S.C. 1319(f) (providing for responsible companies to compensate the
government for the costs of cleanup and remediation for the negligent discharge
of oil).
82. Leopold, supra note 74.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. See Lustgarten, supra note 75.
86. Id.
87. See Pierre Thomas, BP’s Dismal Safety Record, ABCNEWS.COM (May 27,
2010), http://abcnews.go.com/WN/bps-dismal-safety-record/story?id=10763042#.
TtFCjmNFu30.
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Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) fined the company $87
million for its failure to correct the safety problems at the rebuilt
Texas City plant, representing the largest fine in OSHA history.88
In addition, four years after the Prudhoe Bay oil spill, there are
still “hundreds of miles of rotting pipe ready to break that needs
[sic] to be replaced,” according to Marc Kovac, a senior BP
employee who worked on Alaska’s North Slope for more than
three decades.89 In November 2009, a pipeline rupture at BP
Alaska’s Lisburne facility demonstrated BP’s failure to learn from
its past mistakes, in which a February 2001 pipeline ruptured
under similar circumstances.90 As another example, because of
overtime benefits and a shortage of trained personnel, BP had a
history of overworking employees by scheduling them for sixteen
to eighteen hour work shifts.91 This considerable time provides
an “imminent safety risk” since working more than sixteen hours
during a twenty-four hour time period can affect the mental
capacity to make sound and timely decisions.92 Yet, despite
assurances by BP to EPA more than ten years ago that the
company intended to come up with a plan to “fix” the sixteen to
eighteen work shifts, sixteen-plus hour work shifts were routine
at Prudhoe Bay in 2009.93
In evaluating present responsibility, a debarring official shall
consider whether the contractor has implemented or agreed to
implement remedial measures,94 such as an ethics and
compliance program. Debarring officials expect to see certain
essential elements in an ethics and compliance program that
demonstrate the company’s corporate attitude to engage in
responsible and ethical practices. Examples include: strong
support of the program by senior management, demonstrating
the company’s commitment to high standards of business
conduct; responsibility of line managers for the program who are
88. Id.
89. Leopold, Prudhoe Bay, BP’s Other Ticking Bomb, supra note 80.
90. Id. (describing the improper placement of temperature pipe monitors on
the inside of the facility rather than outside where it could provide a better
measurement of temperature for both spills).
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. See FAR 9.406-1(a)(7).
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accountable for the program’s implementation; accountability to
the board of directors; procedures for reporting and addressing
violations; employee training regarding the ethics and compliance
program; and a demonstrated employee commitment to comply
with the standards of conduct.95
The company’s history of continued violations and noncorrective corporate attitude demonstrates internal institutional
problems— rather than isolated incidents—that seem to make
BP, in its entirety, ripe for debarment.
Until now, BP’s
executives and lawyers have fended off such company-wide
debarment actions by promising that BP would “change its ways,”
but despite promises to remedy the problems, many still exist.96
Aside from the $373 million in fines paid by BP over the past
decade,97 according to some employees speaking anonymously,
BP follows an “operate to failure” attitude, meaning that, for
example, BP Alaska avoids spending money on “upkeep” and
instead runs the equipment until it breaks down.98 This type of
procedure typifies what happened in the November 2009 spill,
when an employee performing a routine check discovered oil
pouring out from a gash on the bottom of a twenty-five-year old
pipeline at BP’s facility.99 In other words, an otherwise readily
identifiable problem made during routine checks was
systematically ignored for years until there was ultimate failure.
In the case of the Texas City refinery explosion, BP blamed the
disaster mostly on operator error and fired six employees; their
internal investigation report concluded there was “no evidence of
anyone consciously or intentionally taking actions or decisions
that put others at risk.”100 However, the U.S. Chemical Safety
Board, the federal agency that investigated the incident, found
“[t]he problems that existed at BP Texas City were neither
momentary nor superficial. They ran deep through that operation
of a risk denial and a risk blindness that was not being addressed

95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

See id. at 9.406-1(a).
Lustgarten, supra note 75.
See Thomas, supra note 87.
Leopold, Prudhoe Bay, BP’s Other Ticking Bomb, supra note 80.
Id.
Schorn, supra note 79.
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anywhere in the organization.”101 Over the more than eighteen
months of investigations, the U.S. Chemical Safety Board “found
problems at Texas City just about everywhere they looked:
antiquated equipment, corroded pipes about to burst, and safety
alarms that did not work.”102 The result, as discussed infra in
Part V: BP paid a $50 million fine and the Texas City facility was
statutorily debarred, but BP was allowed to continue to do
business with the government.103 Five years later, Deepwater
Horizon occurred.
V.

ANALYSIS AND PROPOSAL FOR REFORM

The example of BP sheds light on some of the flaws of the
current debarment system. Despite BP’s history of apparent
noncompliance, accrual of fines and penalties associated with
environmental misconduct, seeming lack of remediation and
corrective action taken, and statutory debarment of individual BP
facilities, the question remains: not why BP as an entire
corporation—rather than just individual facilities or business
units—has not already been debarred, but whether BP even could
be discretionarily debarred.
While the current debarment
regulatory framework is indeed effective in protecting the
government from conducting business with small government
contractors,104 the system is weak and largely ineffective in
furthering the purposes of debarment when federal agencies
contract with large corporations like BP. Quite simply, some
companies are too big to ban, providing these companies with the
ability to essentially circumvent the threat of company-wide
debarment when faced with the choice of whether to conduct
themselves properly or whether to follow “business as usual”
methods. For some large companies who can afford the costs, it

101. Id.
102. Id.
103. See BP P.L.C. Texas Refinery Explosion – Guilty, Fed. Contractor
Misconduct Database, POGO.ORG, http://www.contractormisconduct.org/
index.cfm/1,73,222,html?CaseID=828 (last visited Oct. 1, 2011).
104. See, e.g., Burke v. EPA, 127 F. Supp. 2d 238, 2390 (D.D.C. 2001)
(representing an effective debarment process and result for a small government
contractor who engaged in improper conduct demonstrating a lack of business
integrity).
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might be worth it to accept fines, penalties, and occasional facility
debarment instead of changing their practices to come into
compliance with environmental regulations.
To illustrate, the top 100 government contractors (as
measured by total amount of federal dollars awarded through
government contracts) have paid more than $25 billion in
penalties for fraud, bribery, falsifying records and other violations
over the past fifteen years, but only four of them have been
suspended at any point during that time from government
contracting on a company-wide basis, and none have been
debarred.105 These companies are Boeing, GTSI, IBM, L-3
Communications, and Agility (formerly PWC Logistics, not a Top
100 contractor).106 These are primarily defense contractors and
providers of technological goods and services, companies not
regularly involved in types of services giving rise to
environmental violations (like oil and gas companies).
Additionally, there has not been one company among the Top 100
federal government contractors since 1995 that has been
suspended or debarred on a company-wide basis for an
environmental violation.107
The statistics involving the largest oil, gas, and natural
resources companies with regard to misconduct, on the other
hand, are particularly telling. BP, for example, was ranked sixtyfifth in total federal contract award dollars in FY2010 ($1,033.3

105. See
Fed.
Contractor
Misconduct
Database,
POGO.ORG,
http://www.contractormisconduct.org (last visited Nov. 13, 2011).
106. For descriptions of these companies, see Boeing Comp., Fed. Contractor
Misconduct Database, POGO.ORG, http://www.contractormisconduct.org/
index.cfm/1,73,221,html?ContractorID=13&ranking=2 (last visited Nov. 13,
2011); GTSI Corp., Fed. Contractor Misconduct Database, POGO.ORG,
http://www.contractormisconduct.org/index.cfm/1,73,221,html?ContractorID=28
(last visited Nov. 13, 2011); IBM Corp., Fed. Contractor Misconduct Database,
POGO.ORG,
http://www.contractormisconduct.org/index.cfm/1,73,221,html?
ContractorID=32 (last visited Nov. 13, 2011); L-3 Communications, Fed.
POGO.ORG,
Contractor
Misconduct
Database,
http://www.contractormisconduct.org/index.cfm/1,73,221,html?ContractorID=37
(last visited Nov. 13, 2011); Agility (formerly PWC Logistics), Fed. Contractor
Misconduct Database, POGO.ORG, http://www.contractormisconduct.org/
index.cfm/1,73,221,html?ContractorID=62 (last visited Nov. 13, 2011).
107. See generally Fed. Contractor Misconduct Database, POGO.ORG,
http://www.contractormisconduct.org/ (last visited Nov. 30, 2011).

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol29/iss1/6

24

2011]

POLLUTING WITHOUT CONSEQUENCE

281

million) but has the highest number of instances of misconduct
since 1995 (fifty-seven instances, tied with Lockheed Martin and
Exxon Mobil) and paid the fourth highest amount of dollars in the
forms of fines and penalties ($2,653.2 million “misconduct
dollars”) since 1995.108 Exxon Mobil, ranked 124th in total federal
contract dollars ($232.3 million) in FY2010, is tied with BP and
Lockheed Martin for the highest number of instances of
misconduct (57) since 1995, and paid the fifth highest amount of
misconduct dollars ($2,513.5 million) since 1995.109 Chevron
Texaco ranked 132nd in total federal contract dollars ($93.1
million) in FY2010 but likewise has a disproportionate share of
instances of misconduct and payment of fines and penalties due
to these violations—eighth in instances of misconduct (35) since
1995 and twenty-second in misconduct dollars paid ($508.5
million) since 1995.110 Clearly, these major oil and gas companies
are paying exceedingly large fines and penalties in response to a
high number of instances of misconduct, disproportionately more
than what their total pool of federal contract dollars would
indicate. And yet, none of these major companies have ever been
suspended or debarred on a company-wide basis, a perplexing
result given the FAR’s mandate to debar contractors for the
“commission of any other offense indicating a lack of business
integrity or business honesty that seriously and directly affects
the present responsibility of a Government contractor or
subcontractor.”111
So why are large government contractors like BP, Exxon
Mobil, and Chevron Texaco consistently paying millions of dollars
in fines and penalties related to environmental violations but not
being debarred? It is true that large corporations are often better

108. See BP P.L.C., Fed. Contractor Misconduct Database, POGO.ORG, http://
www.contractormisconduct.org/index.cfm/1,73,221,html?ContractorID=61&rank
ing=65 (last visited Nov. 13, 2011).
109. See Exxon Mobil, Fed. Contractor Misconduct Database, POGO.ORG,
http://www.contractormisconduct.org/index.cfm/1,73,221,html?ContractorID=23
(last visited Nov. 13, 2011).
110. See Chrevon Texaco Corp., Fed. Contractor Misconduct Database,
POGO.ORG,
http://www.contractormisconduct.org/index.cfm/1,73,221,html?
ContractorID=140
(last visited Nov. 13, 2011).
111. FAR 9.406-2(a)(5) (setting forth causes for debarment); id. at 9.407-2(a)(9)
(setting forth causes for suspension).
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able to identify and correct misconduct than smaller companies,
which may account for the low rate of suspensions and
debarments for the largest contractors when you consider
agencies’ focus on remediation, mitigation, and correction of
misconduct.112
Likewise, at small companies, the person
responsible for the misconduct might be the company leader,
critical to making or providing what the government needs, which
might warrant debarment for a small company but not
necessarily large companies.113
However, discerning the real answer involves a much more
thorough investigation. As mentioned previously, the company
might simply be too big and involved in the government process
to logistically be suspended or debarred by the contracting
agency. It is not necessarily because the agency failed to
diligently and enthusiastically pursue administrative options like
suspension and debarment but, rather, because of the greater
defects of the system as a whole. For example, a provision in the
FAR provides that if “compelling reasons” related to national
security or urgency exist to dictate the need to use the particular
contractor or subcontractor in question, debarment may be
avoided.114 Given that BP supplies eighty percent of the fuel to
the military stationed in the Middle East,115 these circumstances
might prove to be “compelling reasons” to not debar BP as a
government contractor. This gives the contracting agency an
incredible amount of discretion, perhaps too much.
EPA
routinely and discretionarily suspends and debars smaller
companies and individual facilities that have CWA or CAA
violations pursuant to their authority under section 508 of the
CWA and section 306 of the CAA. BP’s case is different because
of the Defense Department’s extreme reliance on BP’s services.116
Furthermore, the government might be wary of interrupting
oil and gas production that could affect energy prices or taking

112. See Ron Nixon, Size Protects Government Contractors That Stray, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 17, 2010), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/18/us/
politics/18contractor.html.
113. See id.
114. FAR 9.405-1(b).
115. See Leopold, supra note 74.
116. Id.
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action that could threaten the jobs of thousands of BP employees,
not to mention that the cost of replacing BP as a contractor might
be too high to justify the debarment of such a large entity. Thus,
the Department of Defense would not debar BP because of its
strong ties and reliance on BP, just as EPA would not debar BP
on a company-wide basis for other “compelling” policy reasons. In
addition, the Department of Justice’s pending litigation of
Deepwater Horizon might have a residual effect on an agency’s
decision whether to debar BP. One of the penalty factors set forth
in section 311(b)(8) of the CWA includes the economic impact of
the penalty on the violator, i.e., the financial ability to pay a
penalty.117 If BP were debarred by the EPA for environmental
misconduct-related reasons or by another agency for other
reasons, BP would argue during Deepwater Horizon settlement
discussions that debarment will impact their future earnings and
thus their ability to pay. Even though debarment decisions
should not be based on ongoing litigation but rather on agencyspecific internal decision making procedures, the result
nevertheless may be that the agency might be influenced by the
effect a debarment might have on the pending litigation.118 It
seems, therefore, that BP and other large corporate entities with
whom the government frequently contracts have found a loophole
in the debarment regime.
Despite this problem, there is an answer. The FAR allows for
the continuation of current contracts, providing that:
“[n]otwithstanding the debarment, suspension, or proposed
debarment of a contractor, agencies may continue contracts or

117. CWA § 311(b)(8), 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(8) (“In determining the amount of a
civil penalty . . . the Administrator, Secretary, or the court . . . shall consider the
seriousness of the violation or violations, the economic benefit to the violator, if
any, resulting from the violation, the degree of culpability involved, any other
penalty for the same incident, any history of prior violations, the nature, extent,
and degree of success of any efforts of the violator to minimize or mitigate the
effects of the discharge, the economic impact of the penalty on the violator, and
any other matters as justice may require.”) (emphasis added).
118. See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Memorandum from Larry D. Thompson,
Deputy Attorney General, Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business
Organizations
(Jan.
20,
2003),
http://www.justice.gov/dag/cftf/
corporate_guidelines.htm (“Prosecutors should also be aware of non-penal
sanctions that may accompany a criminal charge, such as potential suspension
or debarment from eligibility for government contracts.”).
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subcontracts in existence at the time the contractor was debarred,
suspended, or proposed for debarment unless the agency head
directs otherwise.”119 In other words, a suspension or debarment
is intended to only have future effect on the ability to contract.
While it may, indeed, be logistically more difficult for an agency
to find a new contractor to replace a newly suspended or debarred
contractor, there should in theory be no effect upon the currentlyexisting contract. This should provide time for the agency to
solicit bids and award a new contract to interested and qualified
contractors with strong track records of compliance and business
integrity who will comply with the ethical and legal demands that
the FAR places on them. Reforms to the FAR should be made to
account for situations where a current contract is set to expire
(and before a new contract can be awarded to a presently
responsible contractor) in order to allow an agency head to be
able to extend the life of the current contract until the new one
can begin.
Despite these logistical hurdles, debarment of a large
multinational corporation like BP on a company-wide basis could
be a very real possibility, which would be a certain method for the
government to ensure that they no longer conduct business with a
corporation that has so irresponsibly behaved in connection with
their federal contracts, or at least until the company is able to
adequately demonstrate its business integrity and commitment
towards environmental ethics.
Even before the Deepwater
Horizon explosion, EPA debarring officials were considering
discretionary debarment of the entire company regarding its
unresolved debarment cases in Alaska and Texas.120 At present,
the EPA Suspension and Debarment Office has “temporarily
suspended” any further discussion with BP on debarment matters
until the completion of an investigation into the Deepwater
Horizon can be concluded.121 Should EPA ultimately decide to

119. FAR 9.405-1(a).
120. See Lustgarten, supra note 75.
121. Id. (“. . . the EPA suspended negotiations with the petroleum giant over
whether it would be barred from federal contracts because of the environmental
crimes it committed before the spill in the Gulf of Mexico. Officials said they are
putting the talks on hold until they learn more about the British company's
responsibility for the plume of oil that is spreading across the Gulf.”)
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debar BP, the effects on the company would be sweeping: “Even a
temporary expulsion from the U.S. could be devastating for BP’s
business.”122 A discretionary debarment would cancel not only
the company’s future contracts to sell fuel to the military, but
prohibit BP from leasing or renewing drilling leases on federal
land as well as cancel other contracts BP holds with other
agencies, resulting in losses worth billions of dollars.123 In the
end, the question is not whether BP could be debarred as a
government contractor but, rather, will they? Rep. Bart Stupak
(D-Mich.) said it best: “the U.S. government needs to look at all
possible options when it comes to showing BP, or any corporate
bad actor, that a continued culture of cost cutting and increased
risk taking will absolutely not be tolerated.”124
If the federal government is actually serious about
conducting business with presently responsible corporate
partners to protect the public interest—and not just with a
smattering of smaller contractors—reforms need to be made to
the regulatory framework and agencies need to begin following
the rhetoric they preach. To demonstrate the government’s
stated policies with its contradictory actions, the Department of
Justice’s internal guidance on prosecuting business organizations
states:
In evaluating the severity of collateral consequences, various
factors . . . such as the pervasiveness of the criminal conduct and
the adequacy of the corporation’s compliance programs, should be
considered in determining the weight to be given to this factor.
For instance, the balance may tip in favor of prosecuting
corporations in situations where the scope of the misconduct in a
case is widespread and sustained within a corporate division (or
spread throughout pockets of the corporate organization). In such
cases, the possible unfairness of visiting punishment for the
corporation’s crimes upon shareholders may be of much less
concern where those shareholders have substantially profited,
even unknowingly, from widespread or pervasive criminal
activity. Similarly, where the top layers of the corporation’s
management or the shareholders of a closely-held corporation
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Smith, supra note 73.
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were engaged in or aware of the wrongdoing and the conduct at
issue was accepted as a way of doing business for an extended
period, debarment may be deemed not collateral, but a direct and
entirely appropriate consequence of the corporation’s
wrongdoing.125

Yet, BP and others like them know that the current system
treats these large contractors as “special” and that although they
may have to pay millions of dollars in administrative and
criminal fines and penalties in connection with their
environmental misconduct, the system would never allow them to
be debarred or suspended on a company-wide basis—a far more
catastrophic result to their business than the payment of fines
and penalties. It is not until federal agencies begin to actually
follow through on their congressional and executive mandates
and debar companies, even the largest ones, for their continuous
and systematic civil and criminal misconduct that the true goals
of the debarment regime can be accomplished.
How might these reforms be realistically made? First,
statutory debarment provisions like in the CWA and CAA need to
be strengthened to allow for the automatic or mandatory
debarment of contractors on a company-wide basis and not just
applicable to individual facilities where the violation occurred.
Continuation of the current practice allows deep pocket
companies like BP to continue conducting themselves in an
environmentally irresponsible way without ever having to
seriously face the threat of company-wide debarment, a far
greater deterrent than fines and penalties. Of course, fairness
and economic concerns dictate that company-wide statutory
debarments cannot and should not be designated for every
violation of a statutory debarment provision. However, the
inclusion of language in the FAR, or even in the CWA and CAA,
giving the agency head the ability to debar contractors on a
company-wide basis based on the egregiousness of the violation or

125. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Memorandum from Larry D. Thompson, Deputy
Attorney General, Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations
(Jan.
20,
2003),
http://www.justice.gov/dag/cftf/corporate_guidelines.htm
(emphasis added).

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol29/iss1/6

30

2011]

POLLUTING WITHOUT CONSEQUENCE

287

continued history of noncompliance would be effective in giving
actual teeth to debarment.
Second, while agencies must be able to have some discretion
and flexibility as to their ability to grant exceptions for
“compelling reasons,”126 they cannot rely on it so heavily so as to
effectively provide an escape route for large companies like BP.
Agencies must lead by example and demonstrate that
government contractor misconduct will not go unnoticed in terms
of willingness to actually debar entire companies. To that end,
diversifying the entities that agencies contract with will enable
the government to not rely so heavily on the services of the big
companies. By doing that, the government will have appropriate
alternatives available should a business partner engage in
irresponsible or illicit behavior, while simultaneously spreading
the wealth with small businesses struggling to survive in a shaky
economy. How many more Deepwater Horizon oil spills must
result before agencies are willing to follow their congressional
mandates?
Finally, because debarment is not always a logistical
possibility, other remedial options besides traditional “business
as usual” fines and penalties might, at the least, work towards
accomplishing the goals of environmental protection. Instead,
because the FAR is an all-encompassing regulation and does not
deal exclusively with environmental crimes or misconduct, EPA
Guidance recommending Supplemental Environmental Projects
(SEPs) in lieu of or in addition to fines or penalties paid to the
Treasury might be a solution.127 Although SEPs are meant to be

126. FAR 9.405-1(b).
127. Generally, a SEP is an action undertaken by an alleged violator to engage
in an environmentally beneficial project related to the violation in exchange for
mitigation of the penalty to be paid. Usually, SEPs are made as part of an
enforcement settlement, which carries certain legal requirements: “There must
be a relationship between the underlying violation and the human health or
environmental benefits that will result from the SEP; [a] SEP must improve,
protect, or reduce risks to public health or the environment, although in some
cases a SEP may, as a secondary matter, also provide the violator with certain
benefits; the SEP must be undertaken in settlement of an enforcement action as
a project that the violator is not otherwise legally required to perform.” See
Supplemental Environmental Projects, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/oecaerth/civil/
seps/ (last updated June 6, 2011).
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“undertaken in settlement of an enforcement action,”128 this does
not mean that a SEP requirement could not be added to the FAR
to ensure as optimal a result as possible. Adding such additional
environmental compliance tools to the arsenal of federal agencies
would be effective in demonstrating the government’s real
commitment to environmental enforcement and compliance, and,
in the event that an irresponsible contractor cannot be debarred,
at least the contractor would be engaging in otherwise ethical and
beneficial behavior aimed at the betterment of society and
attainment of the goals of the respective environmental statutes.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Suspension and debarment is a critical tool available to the
government to protect itself from conducting business with
irresponsible and unethical business partners. Although not
intended to be punitive in nature, the realistic effects of
suspension and debarment on government contractors can
provide a needed deterrent effect to ensure that contractors
engage in ethical and presently responsible behavior. Regarding
the suspension or debarment of small companies or individuals,
the current system is effective at protecting the government and
public interest. However, because of regulatory and practical
flaws in statutory and discretionary debarment, large
corporations with long histories of environmental noncompliance,
violations, convictions, and irresponsible behavior like BP are
beating the system. Because of the government’s overreliance on
large contractors, it is unable to adequately protect itself from
irresponsible business partners when those companies engage in
environmental crimes and misconduct and they are able to avoid
the harsher effects of company-wide debarment. Regulatory
reform to the FAR and changes in agency contracting practice is
needed to accomplish the sensible goals of suspension and
debarment.

128. Id.
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